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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective:  
To test for differences in injury rates for contract-operated underground coal mines relative to owner-
operator mines in Kentucky, controlling for other covariates.   
Methods:  
We used disparities between MSHA contractor data and surface reclamation permit data to identify 
mines operated by contractors. We then used negative binomial regression to estimate injury rates from 1999-
2013, controlling for mine and controller characteristics available from MSHA and the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA).  
Results: 
Contractor-operated mines with 15 or fewer full-time equivalents (FTEs) had a statistically-significant 
57 percent higher covariate-adjusted reported traumatic injury rate than similar mines without contract 
operators. Larger contractor-operated mines did not have a statistically significant elevated rate. 
Conclusions:  We detected a significant elevation of traumatic injury rates only among the smallest 
contractor-operated mines. This increase appears substantial enough to warrant attention. 
  
Manuscript (All Manuscript Text Pages, including, References and
Figure Legends - NO AUTHOR INFO)
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The Impact of Contract Operations on Safety in Underground Coal Mines 
 
How a firm chooses to allocate employment has important consequences for the health and safety of 
workers. Weil1 discusses the use of subcontracting arrangements across a number of industries and shows the 
systematic negative effect these agreements can have on worker outcomes. Evidence from high risk industries 
such as petrochemical, construction and trucking indicate the potential negative effects associated with 
contracting.2-4  
This study focuses on underground coal mining, as opposed to surface coal mining, because the risk of 
significant injury is higher in the underground environment.5 There are two main types of contracting 
arrangements prevalent in the coal industry: independent contractors and contract operators. An independent 
contractor is "any person, partnership, corporation, firm association or other organization that contracts to 
perform services or construction at a mine."6 Subcontracting of this variety provides for gains in specialization 
to the operator and in terms of economic efficiency more broadly. On the other hand, a contract operator runs 
day-to-day activities of the mining operation and is liable for employees but typically leases mine operating 
rights and equipment from a larger, unaffiliated company and sells all production to that company.  
In the latter case, the owner of the mine may use the contractor to shift liability for pension and health 
obligations of union mine operators to other entities; to lower the cost of civil penalties arising from violations 
of the Mine Safety and Health Act; and to avoid other employment related costs. In addition, contracting can be 
a means of shifting legal liability to low capitalized entities as a means of reducing costs associated with 
potential torts. When contracting is used to pursue these ends, social costs can be significant.  
There is some evidence that these ownership arrangements were used to avoid collective bargaining 
agreements in the early 1990s.7,8 For instance, Massey Energy had different ownership policies depending on 
the type of mining situation: the company should control high quality coal with good mining conditions; for 
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reserves that weren’t as attractive they set up financial relations with operators to guarantee ’reasonably assured 
profit but avoid mining risk’; and finally thin seamed mines that were hard to extract from were given to 
contractors under a brokerage relationship (Nyden, 1993b). Referred to as the Massey Doctrine, this type of 
arrangement suggests that contract operations are likely smaller and riskier operations than owner-operated or 
subsidiary mine operators. 
Determining which operations are contractor operations is challenging, so few studies have focused on 
determining the effect of these ownership arrangements on health and safety outcomes. However, several 
studies have attempted to characterize injury disparities between independent contractors and operator-
employed mine workers.  Muzaffar et al.9 evaluated data on both independent contract workers and traditional 
mine workers between 1998 and 2007 to determine if there were notable differences between the two groups in 
relation to fatal mining accidents.  Their data indicated that the univariate odds of a fatal incident as opposed to 
a non-fatal incident were 2.8 times higher for contracted workers than operators.  They also utilized a 
multivariate model, which associated other factors with fatality.  These included being an independent contract 
worker, being more than 8 hours into a working day, and having less overall experience in that specific mine.  
A 2011 study by Pappas and Mark10 suggested that there were large safety disparities between 
contractor-operated underground coal mines and non-contractor mines.  Examining the period from 1992 to 
2009, they calculated the contract operator injury rate per 200,000 hours to be 16.6, as compared to 10.8 for all 
mines. However, there were two major problems with this comparison. First, their method of identifying 
contractor-operated mines excluded mines with no injuries, thus biasing upward the calculated injury rate.  In 
addition, the injury rate comparison did not take mine size into account. Contractor-operated mines are 
generally smaller, and smaller mines tend to have higher injury rates.    
Work done by Buessing and Weil in a 2014 working paper11 suggests that there is “increased risk 
exposure for contract operations and mines with high contractor utilization”.  They used MSHA data from 2000 
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to 2010 and modeled factors leading to negative health outcomes, such as geology, unionization, mine size, 
controller, and history of violations.  Their results suggested that there are certain contracting companies that 
are typically performing riskier work (construction, blasting, etc.).  As a result, there are differences in the types 
of contractors that are hired – some that are higher risk positions, and some that have lower injury rates 
(engineers, for example).  They suggest that there are increased rates of injuries among contractor workers 
overall. 
The relationship between contractor-operated mining and workplace injury and illness may be an 
important aspect to consider in any strategy used to improve worker outcomes. The primary barrier to 
understanding this relationship has been a lack of data on these contracting arrangements.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data 
The universe of mines considered for analysis is quarterly observations of all active Kentucky 
underground mines from 1999 through 2013.  
To create this dataset, we linked: 
 Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Data: We extracted quarterly production and 
employment files along with administrative records on mine operators  from MSHA’s Enforcement 
Data (website: http://ogesdw.dol.gov/views/data_catalogs.php). 
 Applicant Violator System (AVS) Data: This database from the Office of Surface Mines (OSM) has 
information on all the mining permits issued in the US. We were provided with an AVS data extract 
for all Kentucky permits going back to 1983.  Each observation is a permit entry with issue date and 
expiration date. The data also contain information on the MSHA mine identifiers (MSHA IDs) 
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covered by the permit, the permit holder, its parent company, the operator and the operator’s parent 
company. 
 Surface Mining Information System (SMIS) Data: Available through Kentucky’s Division of Mine 
Permits, the database was used as an alternative source for linking permits to MSHA IDs. Along 
with providing the relevant permit numbers for a MSHA ID, it also provided information on 
ownership and mine location.  The interface can be accessed through the website 
(http://minepermits.ky.gov/Pages/SurfaceMiningInformationSystem.aspx). 
 Kentucky Mine Mapping Information System Data (KMMIS): A tool provided by Kentucky’s 
Division of Mine Safety, this website provides information on permits issued for an MSHA ID.  The 
information on the website allowed us to fill in missing data on the AVS database (website: 
http://minemaps.ky.gov/MineSearch.aspx) 
 The EIA conducts a yearly survey (EIA Form-7A) to gather information on mine characteristics for 
operations that produced 10,000 or more short tons of coal and/or employed workers for 5,000 hours 
or more in a year. To use as covariates, the authors obtained variables gathered in the survey 
including union status, seam height, method of mining used in each working section, and number of 
beds. Some of the variables cannot be accessed publicly through the EIA, and we obtained them 
through a data access agreement with the EIA for use in this project.  
Using these databases, we constructed a quarterly panel database of all active underground mines in 
from 1999 through 2013.  The database contained owner and operator information, as well as information about 
controlling company-subsidiary relationships. If the permit holder (that is the owner) was not the same as the 
operator and neither was connected to the other by common ownership or a subsidiary relationship, we 
concluded that the mine had a contractor operator. Otherwise, we concluded that the mine was owner-operated.   
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Some mines did not have permit data using our method merging MSHA IDs and time periods.  We filled 
in this missing information by using the KMMIS and SMIS.  Specifically, we first did a manual search for 
MSHA ID’s that had no permit information in the AVS.   If any permitting information existed, it was entered 
in a manner similar to the AVS data and subsequently merged with the MSHA data using the MSHA ID.  As a 
quality control measure, two research assistants independently conducted this process.  Any discrepancy across 
the two independent entries was pulled for further review and, after comparing the two manual entries with the 
original source, one of the two was kept.   
Some MSHA IDs had permitting information, but the permit dates did not cover all production periods.  
Each of these problematic observations was reviewed individually and our best judgment about the correct 
permit information for a given quarter was determined using the KMMIS and SMIS data.   
There were situations where the controller listed by MSHA was a subsidiary of a larger company. To 
avoid counting a subsidiary as a contract operator, we gathered the top national coal producer lists from 1994-
2012 (all years publicly available online through the Energy Information Administration (EIA)).  We compared 
this list to our mine dataset to determine which of those companies that appeared on the EIA’s lists also 
appeared in our dataset.  For those companies that were present in both lists, we acquired their subsidiaries’ 
names from the U.S. Security Exchange Commission for all years that information was available.  For every 
subsidiary, we manually checked if they were listed as a controller in the MSHA dataset.  This examination 
allowed us to account for spelling discrepancies between the S.E.C. and our mine dataset.  We adjusted our 
algorithm to recode any mines operated by these subsidiaries as non-contractor operations. 
Our analysis was further limited to include only mines with fewer than 60 FTEs (full time equivalent 
workers). Only 3 percent of mine-quarters that we identified as contractor-operated had more than 60 FTEs in a 
calendar quarter. To make proper statistical comparisons, it would be inappropriate to include larger mines in 
the non-contractor sample because there are very few comparable mines in the contractor sample. The sample 
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was then split by contractor status.  There were 2,966 mine-quarters in the years 1993-2013 that were 
contractor-operated, 3,251 not contractor-operated, and 684 that lacked adequate information to determine 
contractor status.  
Unlike the contractors in the MSHA contractor database, which include any contracting operation with 
work related to mining, this measure indicates which mines are owner-operated and which mines are contractor-
operated.  Because the method proposed in this report is not a direct measure of contract operations, but a proxy 
using other information, we compared our measure with information from external sources to determine the 
accuracy of our measure. These are described in an online appendix: Contractor Determination Quality Checks. 
 
 
METHODS 
Outcome variables 
Injury Rates: We focus on the number of traumatic injuries. When considering reported injuries as an 
outcome, the issue of underreporting should be addressed. There are a number of reasons a mine may choose to 
not report injuries, including lowering workers compensation premiums which are (imperfectly) experience 
rated, and potentially decreasing the probability of inspection.12 Because some of these motivations may be 
related to reasons to contract out work, using reported injuries as a dependent variable could yield biased 
estimates. We considered using fatalities, which are the least likely of the measures to be underreported. 
However, fatalities are rare, so we did not have enough statistical power to link company characteristics to 
fatality rates. As a result, we provide results on our preferred measure – traumatic injuries. We use the 
definition for a traumatic injury provided in Morantz.13 Traumatic injuries probably suffer from less reporting 
bias than non-traumatic injuries because they are more obviously associated with working in a mine and less 
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likely to be questioned by the employer. Traumatic injuries are more prevalent than fatalities, but less likely to 
suffer from underreporting than are total injuries. About 40% of reported injuries are traumatic.  
Control variables 
A mine has many characteristics that could affect injury and violation rates beyond the fact that it is run 
by a contract operator. For instance, mines with very low seam heights are typically more dangerous, if all other 
factors that determine the probability of increased injury are equivalent between two mines.14 Also, larger mines 
will tend to have more injuries because more individuals are potentially exposed at any given time. It is 
important to control for all these factors to avoid attributing a relationship between contractor status and the 
outcomes of interest that can be explained by other features of the mine.  The MSHA and EIA data provide a 
number of key mine characteristics, summarized in Table 1. These characteristics are controlled for in all the 
specifications.  
Figure 1 indicates that our measure of contractor-operated mines was relatively flat until 2006, seemed 
to begin a decline until 2011 but has been increasing in recent years. Table 2 provides statistics describing our 
final sample and highlighting the difference in characteristics of mines identified as contractor-operated from 
those that are not contractor-operated.  The table only provides information for mines with fewer than 60 FTEs 
(full time equivalent workers). As noted above, this is because there are very few mines identified as contract 
operations with more than 60 full FTEs. Even with this limitation, contract operations tend to be smaller both in 
terms of employment and production, in line with expectations about contract operator characteristics.  In Table 
2, contractor-operated mines’ injury rates appear to be lower than those of mines not operated by contractors. 
Contractor-operated mines also tend to have less recoverable reserves, have thinner coal beds, and are more 
likely to use conventional mining methods. These are all factors that make them less attractive to operate.  We 
were unable to determine the contractor status of 11 percent of mine-quarters. These mines tended to have 
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characteristics more like contractor than non-contractor mines, with even lower average FTE employment, 
lower recoverable reserves, and greater use of conventional mining. (See Table 2.)  
Statistical Specification 
Injuries in a mine-quarter are count data and tend to be clustered at lower values such as 0 and 1. From 
Table 2, we can also see that the variance is much greater than the mean of the injury rate. For this kind of data, 
the appropriate statistical approach is negative binomial regression, which we use.  The regression specification 
is: 
𝑌𝑚,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐶𝑚,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛿𝑚 + 𝜀𝑚,𝑡 
Where Y is the injury rate in a given mine (m), quarter (t), C is the contractor status of that mine, and X are a set 
of mine-quarter specific controls. We also include an interaction between contractor status and the size category 
of the mining operation (𝑆𝑚,𝑡), allowing the contractor effect to vary by size category. Finally, we include time 
(𝜏𝑡) and MSHA district (𝛿𝑚) fixed effects.  To see if our results were sensitive to the omission of mines with 
unknown contractor status, we ran the traumatic injury regressions after having recoded all missing data on 
contractor status to zero and then to one.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Among mines with up to 60 FTEs, we identified the contractor status of 88 percent of the active 
underground coal mine-quarters in Kentucky between 1999 and 2013. We identified these mines by comparing 
the operator identified in MSHA records with the reclamation permit holder, supplemented with additional 
information about controllers and subsidiaries. We found no trend over the study period in the proportion of 
these mines operated by contractors (Figure 1). However, in the last 5 years of our data, there was an upward 
trend among the smallest mines, where contractor operation is concentrated.  
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Table 3 shows the impact of contractor status and mine size on total injury rates, allowing the contractor 
impact to differ by mine size. Column (2) shows the impact on traumatic injury rates. (For a full listing of 
estimated IRRs for both traumatic and all injuries, see Online Appendix Table A1.) Rather than presenting the 
regression coefficients, we use the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) for ease of exposition. The IRR for the injury 
regression is the ratio of the injury rate to a baseline rate related to a one unit increase in an independent 
variable. In Table 3, the reference group is non-union, non-contractor-operated mines using the continuous 
mining method. Each IRR indicates the ratio of the rate in contractor-operated mines to non-contractor-operated 
mines in the same size class.  
In the 1999-2013 period, contractor-operated mines with 15 or fewer FTEs had a statistically-significant 
57 percent higher covariate-adjusted traumatic injury rate than similar mines without contract operators (Table 
3). There was no statistically significant difference in the covariate-adjusted traumatic injury rate in mines with 
more than 15 but no more than 30 FTEs.  For mines with more than 30 and up to 60 FTEs, contractor-operated 
mines experienced a covariate-adjusted injury rate 73 percent of otherwise similar non-contract mines. That is, 
contractor-operated mines appear to be less risky in these mines.  
When we ran the traumatic injury regressions after having recoded all missing data on contractor status 
to zero and then to one, we found small changes in the estimated IRRs reported in Table 3. However, our 
qualitative conclusions were not altered. (See Online Appendix Table A2 for these results.) 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using MSHA, EIA, and mining permit data, we categorized 89 percent of small underground coal mines 
in Kentucky by whether they were contractor-operated. We found a statistically significant increase in traumatic 
injury rates among the smallest of contractor-operated mines. This increase appears substantial enough to 
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warrant attention. Still, contractor-operated underground mines with 30 to 60 employees appeared to have lower 
injury rates than comparable mines that were owner-operated.   
The recent decline in the price of coal may lead to changes in the operation of small mines. Larger 
mining companies may be less willing to operate these relatively marginal mines, which could result in their 
being closed or in more of them being operated by contractors. These developments could decrease or increase 
injury risk and should be followed.  
Like Morantz,13 we found that unionized mines had much lower traumatic injury rates than non-union 
mines. On December 31, 2014, Kentucky’s last unionized mine shut down. Without the added protection that 
unions offer, the risk of injury is likely to increase unless operators and regulators increase their focus on injury 
prevention.  
Limitations 
The results in this analysis are not necessarily causal. There are a number of factors that could explain 
our findings. For instance, selection bias may be driving the relationship between potential contract operations 
and injury risk. Smaller mines are often more dangerous, and their production volumes tend to be lower. We 
control for mine size and productivity. However, these factors could still influence the results through an 
indirect channel. The type of non-contract operators running mines with these characteristics may be different 
on average than companies running larger operations. Willingness to operate a small mine in and of itself may 
indicate weaker management in general and safety management in specific.  
Also, even though we attempted to minimize reporting bias by focusing on traumatic injuries, studies 
have shown that underreporting occurs even for traumatic injuries.15,16  If contractors report a smaller proportion 
of their injuries than do non-contractor-operated mines, studies like this one would underestimate the risk of 
contractor-operated mines. MSHA requires mine operators to report all injuries at the mine, including injuries of 
independent contractors.  If independent contractors, which tend to have high injury rates, are more prevalent in owner-
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operated mines, it would likely bias our results so as to not find an effect. We should note that these results apply only 
to underground coal mines in Kentucky. Experience may differ in West Virginia and other states with 
contractor-operated underground coal mines. 
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Figure Legend 
 
FIGURE 1. Proportion of Underground Coal Mines Operated by Contractors, 1999-2014  
All mines and small mines (<= 60 full-time equivalent employees) 
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TABLE 1: Description of Variables.  
Variable Definition Source 
Contractor indicator Indicator for mine's status as a contract operation MSHA, AVS, 
SMIS, 
KMMIS 
Mine size Full time equivalents (FTEs), or 500 employee hours 
per quarter (equivalent to 2,000 hours per year) 
MSHA 
Mine size categories Category 1: 0 -15 FTEs; Category 2: 15 - 30 FTEs; 
Category 3: 30 - 60 FTEs 
 
Log of controller size Natural log of controller size, with controller size 
measured in units of 100 FTEs 
MSHA 
Mine age Age of mine in years since the first operator began 
work at the mine (top censored at 43) 
MSHA 
Productivity Millions of tons of coal per 200,000 employee hours MSHA 
District indicators Indicators for whether a mine is in a particular MSHA 
district (used to determine if the mine is in Kentucky) 
MSHA 
Subunit indicators Indicators for a particular subunit (underground, 
surface, office, etc.) 
MSHA 
Quarter/year 
indicators 
Indicators for whether an observation is in a 
particular year or quarter 
MSHA 
Inspection days Number of MSHA inspection days (defined as five 
inspection hours) in a quarter 
MSHA 
Union indicator Indicator for whether a mine is unionized EIA 
Number of coal beds Number of coal beds at a particular mine EIA - 
Confidential 
Mean coal bed 
thickness 
Average thickness, in inches, of the coal bed at a 
particular mine 
EIA - 
Confidential 
Recoverable reserves Estimated tons of recoverable coal reserves (in 
100,000 ton units) 
EIA - 
Confidential 
Traumatic injury Amputations, enucleations, fractures, chips, 
dislocations, foreign bodies in eyes, cuts and 
lacerations, punctures, burns/scalds, crushings,  
burns, and fatal injuries. 
 
MSHA 
Mining method 
percentages 
Percent of underground operation that uses a 
particular mining method (conventional, continuous, 
longwall, shortwall, and other). 
EIA - 
Confidential 
 
 
Table 1
TABLE 2. Study Sample Statistics. Kentucky Underground Mines with <= 60 Full Time 
Equivalent Employees (FTEs), 1999-2013 
  All Contractor 
Non-
Contractor Unknown 
Injuries per 200k hours         
Total 9.4 (35.3) 8.3 (19.8) 10.4 (45.0) 8.4 (28.5) 
Traumatic 3.9 (28.8) 3.4 (12.4) 4.3 (38.1) 3.1 (18.6) 
Basic operational characteristics         
Coal Productivity 0.6 (0.4) 0.6 (0.4) 0.6 (0.4) 0.6 (0.5) 
Mine age (years) 6.6 (6.8) 5.9 (5.8) 7.2 (7.6) 9.0 (7.8) 
          
FTEs 26.0 (15.4) 20.3 (12.0) 31.1 (16.3) 15.5 (11.6) 
Fewer than 15 FTEs 29.7 (%) 39.5 (%) 20.8 (%) 57.3 (%) 
15 to 30 FTEs 32.0 (%) 39.1 (%) 25.7 (%) 29.7 (%) 
30 to 60 FTEs 38.2 (%) 21.5 (%) 53.5 (%) 13.0 (%) 
          
Employees 24.7 (12.8) 21.1 (10.8) 28.0 (13.5) 16.9 (10.0) 
Fewer than 14 Employees 27.2 (%) 35.0 (%) 20.0 (%) 51.6 (%) 
14-28 Employees 35.6 (%) 41.3 (%) 30.3 (%) 34.3 (%) 
28-50 Employees 34.8 (%) 22.3 (%) 46.3 (%) 13.8 (%) 
50+ Employees 2.4 (%) 1.4 (%) 3.4 (%) 0.3 (%) 
          
EIA mine characteristics         
Union 0.8 (%) 0.0 (%) 1.6 (%) 0.0 (%) 
Recoverable reserves 13.5 (34.6) 7.8 (14.8) 18.7 (45.1) 4.9 (19.2) 
Number of coal beds 1.0 (0.1) 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 (0.1) 1.0 (0.0) 
Mean bed thickness (inches) 42.2 (13.6) 38.5 (9.0) 45.5 (16.0) 38.2 (8.7) 
          
Mining method         
Continuous 83.8 (%) 76.5 (%) 90.4 (%) 72.3 (%) 
Conventional 10.7 (%) 17.1 (%) 4.8 (%) 12.4 (%) 
Longwall 0.1 (%) 0.1 (%) 0.0 (%) 0.0 (%) 
Shortwall/other 0.6 (%) 0.6 (%) 0.6 (%) 0.1 (%) 
          
Sample size (mine quarters) 6,245 2,981 3,264 688 
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Mine size is measured in Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), where each FTE is 500 employee hours. 
Total injuries include all injuries underground subunit of mines in the sample 
Traumatic injuries are defined by the characteristics of the injury and include amputations, 
enucleations, fractures, chips, dislocations, foreign bodies in eyes, cuts and lacerations, 
punctures, burns/scalds, crushings, burns (chemical, electrical, and laser), and fatalities. 
Productivity is measured as millions of tons of coal produced per 200,000 employee hours 
Inspection days are defined as total on-site inspection hours divided by five. 
Union status was determined using EIA public fields mine data.  
 
Table 2
TABLE 3: Effects on Traumatic Injury Rates, Kentucky 1999-2013, Negative 
Binomial Traumatic Injury Regressions  
 IRR 95% CI 
Contractor, Size Category 1 (0 < FTEs ≤ 15) 1.57 (1.00, 2.47) 
Contractor, Size Category 2 (15 < FTEs ≤ 30) 1.18 (0.89, 1.57) 
Contractor, Size Category 3 (30 < FTEs ≤  60) 0.73 (0.56, 0.95) 
Union 0.45 (0.13, 0.45) 
Mining Method   
   Continuous % 1.00 Referent 
   Conventional % 1.00 (1.00, 1.00) 
   Longwall % 0.82 (0.79, 0.82) 
   Shortwall %  1.00 (0.99, 1.00) 
Observations (mine-quarters) 6184 
Contractor mine-quarters 2945 
 
This table shows the Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) for traumatic injury rates in contractor-operated 
underground coal mines compared with otherwise similar non-contractor-operated mines in the 
same size class.  
TABLE 3
